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NOTES
The Right to Counsel of One's Choice: Joint
Representation of Criminal Defendants
[T]here are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in
the very idea of free government which no member of the Union
may disregard. '
The right to counsel plays a fundamental role in the American
constitutional scheme.2 Yet, the right to counsel, like other constitu-
tional rights, is a dynamic concept, constantly growing in diverse di-
rections as courts explore and expand new areas of that right.
Recently, courts have focused considerable attention on the question
whether one has a constitutional right to be represented by counsel of
his choice.
3
This note examines the question whether, in a joint representa-
tion situation 4, a non-indigent 5 criminal defendant has the right to
1 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932) (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366
(1898)).
2 The fundamental nature of the right to counsel has long been recognized in this coun-
try. Beginning with Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that the necessity of counsel is so vital and imperative that a trial court's failure to
make an effective appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant who, because of igno-
rance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, is incapable of adequately making his own
defense, constitutes a denial of due process. Id at 71. While the holding in Powell was limited
to capital cases arising in state courts, the Supreme Court soon expanded the right to counsel
to include indigent defendants in federal court. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The
Court injohnson also held that if the sixth amendment right to counsel is not complied with,
the federal court is without jurisdiction to hear the case. Id at 468. In commenting on the
right to counsel the Court stated, "[The assistance of counsel] is one of the safeguards of the
Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty."
Id at 462. Later, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963), the Court further
extended the right to counsel to include not only indigent defendants in capital cases, but all
indigents charged with a crime. Then, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), the
Court again expanded the scope of the right to counsel; it did so by broadening the definition
of "crime" to include any case in which the defendant, if found guilty, could be imprisoned.
The Supreme Court has also recognized the importance of the right to counsel in crimi-
nal cases involving non-indigent defendants. Most notably, in Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3
(1954), the Court stated that "regardless of whether petitioner would have been entitled to
the appointment of counsel, his right to be heard through his own counsel was unqualified."
Id at 9.
3 United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W.
3496 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 82-374); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978).
See general'y notes 17 and 19 in/ra.
4 For purposes of this note, the term "joint representation" will refer both to joint repre-
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be represented by counsel of his choice, regardless of any potential
conflicts of interest that may arise from that joint representation.
6
Part I surveys the right to counsel; it explores the nature of the right,
the effect of joint representation on the right, and the possibility of
waiving the right to separate counsel. Part II discusses the Supreme
Court's treatment of joint representation; it examines past Supreme
Court cases 7 addressing this issue, as well as the current case of United
States v. Flanagan .8 Part III considers whether Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 44(c) provides an answer to the questions posed in
Flanagan.
I. The Right to Counsel
A. The Nature of the Rzght to Counsel
The sixth amendment provides that, "[iln all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense."9 However, the sixth amendment right to
sentation (a single attorney or single law firm representing two co-defendants) and to multiple
representation (a single attorney or law firm representing more than two co-defendants).
5 Courts have generally been unwilling to hold that an indigent criminal defendant has
the right to be represented by counsel of his choice. See United States v. Lisle, 454 F.2d 205
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 926 (1972); Torres v. Brierton, 460 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ill.
1978); Durham v. Blankenship, 461 F. Supp. 492 (W.D. Va. 1978); Robertson v. Riddle, 404
F. Supp. 1388 (D.W. Va. 1975). See also Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney oHis Choice,
24 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1974); Note, Criminal Law. Appointment of Counsel. Constitutional and Statu-
toy Guarantees Are not Violated by the Appointment of Counsel Other than that Requested by Defendant,
[Drumgo v. Superior Court of Marin County], 8 Cal. 3d 930, 506 P.2d 1007, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631
(1973), 5 U. oF WEST L.A. L. REv. 74 (1973); Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 996 (1975). Therefore,
this note only addresses the question of whether non-indigent criminal defendants have a
right to be represented by counsel of their choice.
6 While conflicts of interest may arise at any point in the proceeding, see note 27 infra
and accompanying text, most conflict of interest issues in criminal cases involving joint repre-
sentation have been raised at the post-conviction level. United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965,
970 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 77 (1982). This note specifically addresses the question
whether a defendant may challenge a court's disqualification of an attorney prior to trial.
However, in order to reach this question, it is first necessary to examine in some detail the
cases involving post-conviction claims that the effective assistance of counsel has been denied.
7 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1932).
8 679 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No.
82-374). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals decision disqualifying defense counsel, despite the defendant's valid waiver of poten-
tial conflicts of interests, is inconsistent with past Supreme Court and Circuit Court decisions.
9 The entire text of the sixth amendment states,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature of the cause of the accusation; to be confronted
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counsel is not a single, immutable principle. Rather, it is composed
of four distinct concepts:10 the right to have counsel,"1 the right to
some minimal quality of counsel,' 2 the right to a preparation period
sufficient to ensure minimal quality of counsel,' 3 and the right to a
reasonable opportunity to select counsel and to be represented by
selected counsel.14 Thus, the right to counsel is a multifarious con-
cept, growing and changing as each of its facets becomes more
defined.
Even though they are all part of the broad sixth amendment
guarantee of counsel in all criminal cases, these four facets sometimes
conflict. This conflict is especially apparent when two or more crimi-
nal defendants engage a single attorney to represent them.15 More
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10 See Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978).
11 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
12 The right to the effective assistance of counsel has long been recognized as an essential
component of the right to counsel. See generally Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70
(1942); Avery v. Alabama, 307 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57
(1932). Thus, in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the Supreme Court stated
that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Id. at 771 n.14.
Yet, while the Court has acknowledged the right to the effective assistance of counsel, it has
not clearly defined what the "effective assistance of counsel" entails. See Note, CriminalLaw-
Competence, Prefidice, and the Right to "Ejfctive"Assistance of Cousel, 60 N.C.L. REv. 185 (1981).
The Court's failure to provide a standard for determining what constitutes the effective assist-
ance of counsel has been widely criticized. See Note, IneJectiv Assistance of Counsel: the Lingering
Debate, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 659 (1980); Comment, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel- What
Does it Mean Tday?, 59 NEB. L. REv. 1040 (1980); Note, Drawing the Line on the IntFective
Assistance of Counsel Defense: [United States v. Decoster (Il1)], 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1300
(1980). A more extensive discussion of this issue, however, is beyond the scope of this note.
13 The right to a preparation period sufficient to ensure a minimal level of quality of
counsel has generally been discussed in conjunction with the right to the effective assistance of
counsel. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1932); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
57-59 (1932).
14 The development of the right to be represented by counsel of one's choice is discussed
in notes 9-50 infra and accompanying text. The nature and scope of the right to be repre-
sented by counsel of one's choice is discussed in notes 17-19 infra.
15 Joint representation nearly always involves a potential conflict of interest. (For a dis-
cussion of the manner in which conflicts of interest may arise see notes 27-33 infta and accom-
panying text.) It is precisely because of this conflict that courts have often looked with
disfavor upon joint representation. Kaplan v. Bombard, 573 F.2d 708, 715 (2d Cir.
1978) (Mansfield, J., concurring); United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 101 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978); United States v. Armedio-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 592 (2d
Cir. 1975)(A defense counsel's conflict of interest may impair his ability to effectively assist his
client, or to confront witnesses on behalf of his client). Thus, a defendant's insistance on joint
representation may impair the effective assistance of counsel in his case. See Girgenti, Problems
ofJoint Representation of Defendants in a Criminal Case, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 55, 55-56 (1979).
Moreover, even where no conflict of interest occurs, the additional burden of representing
NOTES
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specifically, in joint representation situations the right to counsel of
one's choice often directly conflicts with the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.' 6
In attempting to resolve this conflict, courts have consistently
refused to hold that the right to be represented by counsel of one's
choice is absolute.' 7 While this has been particularly true with re-
spect to indigent defendants, 8 courts have also declined to adopt a
rule giving absolute deference to the defendant's right to choose re-
tained counsel to represent him.' 9 Instead, courts have sought to bal-
another party could conceivably impair effective representation. Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 75 (1932).
16 Because in a joint representation situation a single attorney must "serve two masters,"
a conflict of interest may sometimes result. Wice, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants.
Confcts of Interest and the Responsibility of the Defense Lawyer, 44 TEx. B.J. 729, 734 (1981). This
conflict in turn impairs the effectiveness of counsel's representation. Thus, the defendant's
right to be represented by counsel of his choice may clash with his right to the effective
assistance of counsel. United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1982).
On the other hand, the right to choose counsel and the right to effective assistance of
counsel are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A strong argument can be made that requir-
ing a defendant to accept the representation of an attorney whom he does not trust or whom
he does not desire to have represent him will actually cause ineffective representation, rather
than ensure effective representation. Cf Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (forc-
ing a lawyer on a defendant only leads him to believe that the law contrives against him);
Drumgo v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930, 938, 506 P.2d 1007, 1012, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631, 636
(1973) (Mosk, J., Dissenting); Comment, An Examination of the Sixth Amendment Right to Choose
Retained Counsel, 60 IowA L. REv. 328, 331 (1974).
17 While acknowledging that the right to be represented by counsel is absolute, no court
has held that there is an absolute right to be represented by counsel of one's choice. Davis v.
Stamler, 650 F.2d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Brown, 591 F.2d 307, 310 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 913 (1979)(the sixth amendment does not give a defendant an
absolute, unqualified right to counsel of his choice even when counsel is retained); United
States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069
(1979)(while a defendant should be afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to secure
counsel of his own choice, his right to retain counsel of his choice is not absolute); United
States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978) (same); United States ex rel. Baskerville v.
Deegan, 428 F.2d 714, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928 (1970) (same); United States ex
re. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1215 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970) (the
constitutional requirement is met as long as the accused is afforded a fair or reasonable oppor-
tunity to obtain particular counsel, and as long as there is no arbitrary action prohibiting the
effective use of such counsel).
18 See note 5 supra and accompanying text for a general discussion of the question
whether an indigent defendant has a right to be represented by counsel of his choice.
19 Although no court has held that a criminal defendant has an absolute right to be
represented by counsel of his choice, all courts have recognized that the defendant does have
some right to be represented by chosen counsel. Different circuits, however, have treated this
right with differing degrees of deference. The Eighth Circuit grants the defendant's right to
be represented by counsel of his choice the greatest degree of deference, holding that defend-
ants are free to employ counsel of their choice and the courts are afforded little leeway in
interfering with that choice. United States v. Valenzuela, 521 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976). See also United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir.),
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ance the defendant's right to be represented by counsel of his choice
with two other considerations: the defendant's right to the effective
assistance of counsel, and judicial concern with ensuring the effective
administration of justice.20 Thus, the critical question is: How
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 77 (1982); United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1978), cerl.
denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979). Accord United States v. Horak, 465 F. Supp. 725, 727 (D. Neb.
1979); In re Special February, 1975 Grand Jury, 406 F. Supp. 194, 198 (N.D. Ill. 1975). Simi-
larly, the Second Circuit has held that the defendant's choice of counsel is of constitutional
dimensions and should not be unnecessarily obstructed by the court. United States v. Curcio,
694 F.2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1982);
Abraham v. United States, 549 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Sheiner, 410
F.2d 337, 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825, 859 (1969). Also, the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits afford great deference to the defendant's choice of counsel. United States v. Vargas-
Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 276
(5th Cir. 1975). On the other hand, the Third Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit,
while acknowledging that the defendant's right to choose counsel is a fundamental principle,
state that the defendant need only be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his
choice. Davis v. Stamler, 650 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979); United States v. Liddy, 348 F. Supp. 198,
200 (D.D.C. 1972).
20 The Supreme Court recognized the need for judicial balancing of interests where the
defendant exercises his right to choose counsel solely as a dilatory tactic. Holloway v. Arkan-
sas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). Other courts have held that, even when the defendant is in good
faith (and especially when he is not in good faith) the defendant's right to be represented by
chosen counsel must be balanced against the fair and effective administration ofjustice. Davis
v. Stamler, 650 F.2d 477, 479 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 166
(10th Cir.), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); United States v. Salinas, 618 F.2d 1092, 1093
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 341 (2d Cir.
1979); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 439 U.S.
1069 (1979); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1978); Maynard v.
Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (Ist. Cir. 1976).
Another concern courts sometimes express is a judicial concern in preserving the integ-
rity of the judicial system. See United States v. Armedio-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 593 (2d
Cir. 1975). This concern is most often enunciated, however, in cases involving a conflict of
interest which arises because of successive representation (where an attorney representing a
defendant has previously represented co-defendants or other witnesses involved in the defend-
ant's case) or because of joint representation of grand jury witnesses. See United States v.
Agosto, 675 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1982) (involving both successive representation and joint rep-
resentation of co-defendants); United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 843 (1979) (the defendant requested to be represented by an attorney (Jones) who
was a member of the same law firm as a former Assistant United States Attorney; the latter
attorney had represented the state in a case closely related to the defendant's case. The de-
fendant was actually being tried for allegedly bribing the judge in that case. The district
court refused to grant defendant Kitchin's request to retain attorney Jones, stating that the
defendant's interest in having Jones represent him was insufficient to outweigh the public
suspicion that would likely be aroused by denial of the government's motion.); Pirillo v.
Takiff, 341 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1975), eftd, 352 A.2d 1 1, appealdismissed &cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083
(1976) (holding that the public interest in the effective investigation by a grand jury out-
weighed the interests of defendant-policemen in retaining their own counsel (an F.O.P. attor-
ney)). But see Matter of Grand Jury Empaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1976)
(distinguishing Pirillo).
NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
should this balance be struck?2t
B. Joint Representation and Conflict of Interest
Joint representation per se does not violate the Constitution.22
A number of courts and commentators, however, disfavor joint repre-
sentation.2 3 The primary reason for this disfavor is the potential con-
flict of interest arising from joint representation of criminal
defendants. Such a conflict infringes upon the effective assistance of
counsel, 24 and may cause serious ethical problems.
2 5
Conflicts of interest in a joint representation situation may arise
in a variety of ways and at various stages in the proceedings.2 6 Con-
flicts may arise in planning and executing trial strategy,2 7 in plea
bargaining28 or in offering defenses at trial29-particularly if one de-
21 This balance should be struck in favor of allowing the defendant the right to be repre-
sented by chosen counsel, as long as that right is exercised with full knowledge of its conse-
quences. See generally Holloway v. Arkansas, 424 U.S. 475 (1978); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1942); United States v. Waldman, 579 F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v.
Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1976).
22 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000,
1010 (9th Cir. 1981); Kaplan v. Bombard, 573 F.2d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 175 (1979); United States v.
Mandell, 525 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976); United States v.
Horak, 465 F. Supp. 725 (D. Neb. 1979).
23 See, e.g., Salomon v. LaVallee, 575 F.2d 1051, 1053 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 101 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978); United States v.
Mari, 526 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941
(1976). Moreover, at least one judge would forbid such representation altogether. United
States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1057-58 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Geer, Representation of Multi-
ple Criminal Defendants: Conjhcts of Interest and Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62
MINN. L. REV. 119 (1978).
24 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 482. The Supreme Court further noted in Holloway
that "in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil . . . is in what the
advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to the
possible pre-trial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process." Id at 490 (emphasis in
original). See also United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 1981).
25 For an excellent discussion of the defense attorney's ethical duties in joint representa-
tion situations, see Geer, supra note 23, at 146-62.
26 See Girgenti, Problems ofJoint Representation of Defendants in a Criminal Case, 54 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 55, 61 (1979).
27 United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 77 (1982) (citing
Note, Developments in the Law-Conflits of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1244,
1381-83 (1981)). The Court noted that in planning trial strategy, the attorney may make
decisions favoring one defendant over another. Id at 971 n.5. See also United States v.
Medel, 592 F.2d 1305, 1311 (5th Cir. 1979).
28 United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d at 971 n.5.
29 Id
In offering defenses at trial, the attorney may harm one or more defendants. If he
steers a neutral course, he may deny the less culpable defendants the chance to
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fendant's defense is inconsistent with that of another defendant. 30
Conflicts may also arise if the testimony of one defendant inculpates
another.3' Moreover, the very fact that an attorney appears on be-
half of a group of defendants may make some defendants appear
guilty by association.32
The existence of conflicts, or even the possibility that conflicts
will arise, poses serious ethical considerations for the defense attor-
ney.33 Rule 1.7 of the proposed final draft of the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct prohibits an attorney from representing a
client if the lawyer's ability to represent that client "will be adversely
affected by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, or to a third
person. ' 34 In the comments to Rule 1.7 the drafters expounded upon
the attorney's duty not to represent conflicting interests in a joint
blame other defendants. If he does attempt to implicate one defendant more heav-
ily, he frustrates that defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
Id See also United States v. Medel, 592 F.2d at 1311.
30 Robinson v. Paratt, 546 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1976); Tague, Multiple Representation and
Conicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 GEO. LJ. 1075, 1077 (1979).
31 Tague, supra note 30, at 1077. See also United States v. Medel, 592 F.2d at 1311.
32 United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 971 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 77
(1982).
33 See generally Geer, supra note 23.
34 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
The entire text of Rule 1.7 states,
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer's ability to consider, recom-
mend or carry out a course of action on behalf of the client will be adversely af-
fected by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by
the lawyer's own interests.
(b) When a lawyer's own interests or other responsibilities might adversely affect
the representation of a client, the lawyer shall not represent the client unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the other responsibilities or interests in-
volved will not adversely affect the best interests of the client; and
(2) The client consents after disclosure. When representation of multiple cli-
ents in a single matter is undertaken, the disclosure shall include explanation of
the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
Rule 1.7 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct would replace EC 5-15 and
DR 5-105 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (1976). Rule 1.7 does not substan-
tially alter the provisions of the present Code, but it does go farther than DR 5-105(A) by
requiring that, when a lawyer's interest is involved, not only must the client consent to the
representation after disclosure, but the representation must also reasonably appear to be com-
patible with the client's best interests. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.7 notes (Proposed Final Draft 1981). Moreover, Rule 1.7 does not employ the "appearance
of impropriety test" which some commentators have advocated and some courts have
adopted. See Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
830 (1976). As the drafters noted, the adoption of such a test would prohibit all dual repre-
sentation, even where such representation has traditionally been considered permissible.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
See also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980).
NOTES
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representation situation stating that since "the potential for conflict
of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so
grave,. . . ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than
one defendant.
'35
Even though they discourage joint representation, the drafters
acknowledge that common representation of persons having similar
interests is proper if three conditions are met: (1) the risk of adverse
effects is minimal; (2) the lawyer reasonably believes the other re-
sponsibilities or interest involved will not adversely affect the best
interest of the client; and (3) the client consents after disclosure.
36
Thus, while the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct
strongly discourage joint representation, they do not completely con-
demn it; instead, they condone joint representation of clients with
non-adverse interests.
37
Overall, the responsibility for determining whether conflicts of
interest exist and, if so, whether their existence may impair the effec-
tive assistance of counsel, must rest with the attorney involved.38 If
an actual conflict of interest which may impair the effectiveness of
the representation does indeed exist, the attorney has an ethical duty
35 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comments (Proposed Final
Draft 1981).
36 Rule 1.7 thus places the burden of disclosure on the attorney. Rule 1.7 also recognizes
that if, after disclosure has been made, the client wishes to continue to retain the same attor-
ney, the client may consent to the attorney's continued representation of him. Therefore,
although Rule 1.7 does not state that a defendant may waive the right to separate, conflict-
free counsel, it does, by implication at least, allow such a waiver. (For a more complete
discussion of the question of waiver, see notes 52-56 infira and accompanying text.) However,
the question whether or not the court must accept a client's consent/waiver is not addressed
in the Rule.
37 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comments (Proposed Final
Draft 1981). The rule is therefore consistent with Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978),
in which the Supreme Court refused to state that joint representation per se violates the
Constitution. See generaly note 23 supra. For a more detailed discussion of the attorney's
ethical duty in current conflict of interest situations, see Annot., 53 A.L.R. FED. 140, 158-61
(1981).
38 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980); United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976); Larry Buffalo Chief v. South Dakota, 425
F.2d 271, 280 (1970); Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 839 (1967). Moreover, if an attorney represents to the court that a conflict of interest
could or does exist, the court should grant the attorney's request for withdrawal. Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485 (1978); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1932). The mere
fact that the attorney has a duty to disclose possible conflicts to the client and to the court,
however, does not preclude the court from making its own independent inquiry. United
States v. Donahue, 560 F.2d 1039, 1044 (1st Cir. 1976) (the court held that the trial court had
a duty to advise co-defendants in a multiple representation situation of the possibility of
conflicts, regardless of the attorney's duty to do the same).
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to withdraw from the case.3 9 Moreover, if the attorney fails to dis-
close the conflict and the court has reason to believe that a conflict
may exist, the court has a duty to inquire into the possibility of such
a conflict.4° If the attorney informs the court that no conflict exists,
however, and if the client wishes to have that attorney continue to
represent him, the court need not assume that the attorney is being
untruthful, nor require that the client retain a different attorney.
Contrary action would unnecessarily deprive the individual of his
right to be represented by the attorney of his choice.
4 1
Despite the potential conflict of interest inherent in joint repre-
sentation, two reasons warrant allowing such representation. First,
the presentation of a common defense may benefit the defendant.
42
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted in his dissent in Glasser v. United
States,43 "Joint representation is a means of insuring against recipro-
cal recrimination. A common defense often gives strength against a
common attack."44 Second, the defendant has a right, not only to be
represented by counsel, but also to be represented by counsel of his
choice.45 These two factors should not be lightly disregarded.46 The
defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to choose counsel is a
critically important 47 and intensely personal decision. Ultimately
39 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.7 (Proposed Final Draft 1981). Counsel's duty to inform the court is a continu-
ing duty since conflicts of interest may arise at any stage in the proceeding. See general/y
Girgenti, Problemr ofJoint Representation of Defendants in a Criminal Cae, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
55, 61 (1979). However, in the interest of promoting the effective administration ofjustice,
counsel should exercise prospective judgment and withdraw from the case as soon as it be-
comes apparent that a conflict could very possibly arise, rather than waiting until the trial is
in progress. Geer, supra note 23, at 148-57.
40 FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c).
41 Willis v. United States, 614 F.2d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Wisniew-
ski, 478 F.2d 274, 284 (2d Cir. 1973).
42 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978).
43 315 U.S. 60 (1932).
44 Id at 92.
45 See general4 Note, Sixth Amenment-Conf'cts of Interest in Multiple Representation of Co-
Defendants, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 536 (1980).
46 See United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983)(No. 82-374) (defendant's choice of counsel should not be
lightly or arbitrarily dealt with); United States v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337, 342 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 825, 859 (1969) (defendant's choice of counsel should not be unnecessarily
obstructed).
47 The Supreme Court remarked upon the importance of this right in Faretta v. Califor-
nia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), stating that to deny a defendant his right to dispense with constitu-
tional safeguards is "to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution." Id at
815 (citing Adams er reL McCann v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80 (1942)). Accord
United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the defendant, and not the court or the attorney, will have to live
with the consequences of the decision. 48 Therefore, just as the de-
fendant has the right to choose not to be represented by counsel, 49 a
choice which may sometimes be to his detriment, so too should the
defendant have the right to choose to be represented jointly with an-
other defendant, even though that choice may eventually prove to
have been unwise.50
C. Waiver of the Right to Separate Counsel
1. Recognizing the Waiver of Separate Counsel
The Supreme Court first recognized the defendant's right to
waive separate representation in Glasser v. United States .5  Since then
most courts have recognized that defendants have the right to waive
separate counsel, provided that their waiver is knowingly and intelli-
48 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Faretta involved the question whether a
criminal defendant had a constitutional right to defend himself, without the aid of counsel.
In holding that the defendant did have such a right, the Court stated,
Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend is
personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the state, will bear the personal
consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free per-
sonally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And
although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his
choice must be honored out of "that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood
of the law."
Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
49 422 U.S. at 834.
50 This is the reasoning the Supreme Court adopted in Farelta. Although the principle
enunciated in Faretta applies only to the right to self-representation, the Court's reasoning in
that case is equally applicable to the joint representation situation. Forcing a defendant to
accept the representation of an attorney whom he does not want is just as reprehensible in a
joint representation situation as it is in a self-representation situation. In both cases, "[to]
thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish thus violates the logic of the
[Sixth] Amendment." Id at 820. Therefore, a strong argument can be made that the
Supreme Court should apply the reasoning adopted in Faretta to its upcoming decision in
United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 1983)(No. 82-374). See also United States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038, 1043 (7th Cir.
1976), noting, but not reaching, the question whether Fareta should be extended to joint
representation situations.
51 315 U.S. at 70. In Glasser, five defendants were prosecuted for conspiracy to defraud
the United States. On the second day of trial, defendant Kretske dismissed his attorney and
the court appointed Stewart, Glasser's attorney, to represent Kretske too, even though Stew-
art informed the court that a conflict existed. Glasser remained silent, and the trial continued
with Stewart representing both Glasser and Kretske. All five defendants were convicted. The
Supreme Court overturned Glasser's conviction on the grounds that he was denied the effec-
tive assistance of counsel. See also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483 n.5 (1978) (stating
that when the court inquired in Glasser whether there had been a waiver, it also confirmed
that a defendant may waive his right to the assistance of conflict-free counsel).
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gently made.52 Indeed, forbidding defendants to waive the right to
separate counsel while allowing them to waive the right to be repre-
sented by counsel altogether 3 would be truly anomalous. 54 More-
over, disallowing the waiver of the right to separate counsel while
allowing the waiver of other constitutional rights would "discrimi-
nate against one right in favor of another when the Constitution does
not so require.
'55
Even though courts recognize that a defendant may, in certain
circumstances, waive the right to separate representation, the courts
do not agree on whether the court must accept that waiver.56 Thus,
the primary dispute surrounding the issue of waiver presently focuses
not so much on the waiver itself but on the courts' treatment of that
waiver.
5 7
52 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 483 n.5; Glasser v. United States 315 U.S. 60, 70
(1942); United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Cunningham,
672 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1982) (the right to a conflict-free attorney may be waived); United
States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 77 (1982) (part of the right to
counsel of choice is the defendant's ability to waive his right to the assistance of conflict-free
counsel, provided that waiver is knowing and intelligent); United States v. Laura, 667 F.2d
365, 371 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1075 (1979); Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1327 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Villareal, 554 F.2d 235, 236 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 802 (1977); United States v.
Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Annot., 64 L. Ed. 2d 907, 938-41 (1981).
53 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
54 United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Curcio,
680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1982); Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978).
55 The cases do not distinguish between waiver of the right to remain silent during inter-
rogation, the right to confer with counsel, the right to representation by competent counsel at
trial, the right to contest accusations of criminality through a plea of not guilty, the right to a
jury trial, and the right to be present at trial. To do so would be to discriminate against one
right in favor of another. While federal courts must strictly enforce the sixth amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel, this constitutional guarantee is not of a "preferred"
nature. United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d at 276.
56 Courts in the following cases have held that the defendant's right to waiver is not
absolute: United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 82-374); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1184
(3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998
(1976). In contrast, other courts have accepted the defendant's voluntary, informed waiver.
United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979); United
States v. Villarreal, 554 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 802 (1977); Abraham v.
United States, 549 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825, 859 (1969).
(Note that the Second Circuit has gone both ways on this issue.) For a further discussion of
the question of waiver, see Annot., 53 A.L.R. FED. 140, 206-19 (1981).
57 The court in Kaplan v. Bombard, 573 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1978), took an interesting
approach to the question of waiver. Instead of viewing the issue as whether the defendant
waived his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, the court chose to view the
issue as whether the defendant asserted his constitutional right to be represented by counsel of
his own choice. Id at 714. Accord United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 22 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982).
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The waiver of separate counsel is subject to certain limitations;
it must be knowingly and intelligently made with an awareness of
the likely consequences of the waiver.58 For a trial judge to deter-
mine that a waiver was knowingly and intelligently made, he must
be satisfied that the defendant is aware of the possible prejudices that
his attorney's continued representation could cause, as well as the
possible detrimental consequences of those prejudices. 59 The judge
may consider the background, experience, and conduct of the ac-
cused60 in determining whether the accused has knowingly and intel-
ligently waived his right to separate counsel. He need not, however,
find that the accused has the skill or knowledge of a lawyer.6 1 If the
judge finds that no competent waiver can be made, he may refuse to
accept the accused's waiver and may disqualify the attorney. 62 Yet,
these limitations on waivers are procedural in nature; they do not au-
thorize courts to refuse to honor the defendant's choice of counsel
based upon a judicial value judgment regarding the wisdom of the
waiver.
In some joint representation cases, courts have held that a trial
judge may refuse to accept the defendant's waiver of separate coun-
sel, even if that waiver was knowingly and intelligently made, when-
ever an actual conflict could possibly arise.63 If a judge refuses to
accept a waiver on the basis of whether an actual conflict exists, how-
ever, he is not limiting his inquiry to whether the appropriate proce-
This case aptly illustrates the tension between the right to the effective assistance of counsel
and the right to be represented by counsel of one's choice discussed in notes 17-19 supra and
accompanying text.
58 United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1181 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938) and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)).
59 United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d at 1181. See also United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d
1053, 1055 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 998 (1976); United States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 277-78 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 5
(1st Cir. 1972); Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
60 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
61 Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 279 (1st Cir. 1976).
62 United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1978).
63 United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 82-374). The reasons the Third Circuit has enunci-
ated for its failure to limit a denial of waiver to situations where the procedural prerequisites
to a waiver have not been met are twofold: the court should exercise its supervisory authority
over members of the bar to ensure that attorneys do not breach the ethical code by engaging
in multiple representation, United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir. 1978), and
the defendant's decision to proceed with joint counsel in the face of possible conflicts impli-
cates other concerns and other people. 679 F.2d at 1076. But see United States v. Armedio-
Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
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dural prerequisites to a waiver have been met. Rather, the judge is
passing on the wisdom of the waiver and, at least impliedly, indicat-
ing that the defendant is not capable of making an intelligent
waiver.64 Yet, if a defendant is capable of intelligently waiving the
right to be represented by any counsel, 65 he is no less capable of intel-
ligently waiving the right to be represented by separate, conflict-free
counsel.66 A judge's refusal to accept a knowing and intelligent
waiver unnecessarily interferes with the defendant's right to choose
counsel. Even those courts that have denied a defendant's waiver
where a strong possibility of actual conflict existed 67 have not done so
lightly.
68
2. A Knowing and Intelligent Waiver
The concept that a defendant may knowingly and intelligently
waive the right to separate counsel presupposes that a defendant re-
alizes the consequences of his choice and the available alternatives. 69
Yet, defendants are rarely sophisticated enough to evaluate the po-
tential conflicts arising from joint representation unless the court or
counsel informs them about the possibility of a conflict and the effect
such a conflict may have on their legal representation.70 Therefore,
64 The district court in United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975), held that
the defendants had not and could not waive the effective assistance of counsel. The court
based its conclusion upon a finding that as laymen the defendants cannot foresee the profes-
sional vice and treachery pregnant in the situation. Id at 275. The court of appeals reversed
the district court's decision.
65 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
66 Compare United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1982) and United States v.
Armedio-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1975) (analogizing the right to self-representation
with the right to be represented by conflict-free counsel) with United States v. Flanagan, 679
F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 82-374)
(expressly rejecting this analogy).
67 United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W.
3496 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 82-374); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976).
68 Flanagan, 679 F.2d at 1076.
69 The waiver of a constitutional right must constitute a voluntary, knowing, and intelli-
gent relinquishment of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938). The determination whether a waiver has met these requirements depends in each
case "upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the back-
&round, experience, and conduct of the accused." Id In a joint representation situation, this
entails ensuring that defendants are alert to the dangers of representation by an attorney
having divided loyalties. United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1982). See also
United States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038, 1044 (7th Cir. 1976).
70 Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also United States v.
Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1058 (2d Cir. 1976); Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359, 360
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) requires trial judges, in all
joint representation situations, to promptly inquire into the joint rep-
resentation and to personally advise each defendant that he has the
right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate repre-
sentation. 71 Once the court has done so, and the defendant has ac-
knowledged his desire to retain joint counsel, the defendant may not
claim on appeal that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
due to joint representation. 72 Rule 44(c), in requiring trial judges to
inform defendants about the possibilities of conflict and the effects
that their decision to retain joint counsel may have on the adequacy
of their representation, provides the defendants with the knowledge
necessary to make an intelligent and effective waiver of their right to
separate counsel.
At least one court has interpreted rule 44(c) as allowing a trial
court to disqualify counsel in a joint representation situation, despite
the defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver of separate counsel.
73
Because of its broad language,74 rule 44(c) can be interpreted as au-
thorizing a judge to refuse to accept the defendant's waiver in cases
where actual conflict may occur. 75 Rule 44(c) does not specify what
particular measures must be taken to guard the defendant's right to
the effective assistance of counsel. It is, therefore, within the trial
court's discretion under rule 44(c) to disqualify counsel. 76 However,
such an expansive interpretation of the rule unnecessarily infringes
71 Prior to the passage of rule 44(c), trial courts treated the judges' duty to inquire into
possible conflicts in vastly different ways. The District of Columbia Circuit required the trial
judge to inquire about possible conflicts at the outset of every case involving joint representa-
tion. Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Campbell v. United States, 352
U.S. 359, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Accord United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979). Other circuits imposed such a duty on the trial judge only if
he had some notice that a conflict might exist. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47
(1980)(noting, however, that a trial court's exercise of its supervisory power to conduct such
an inquiry was desirable); United States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038, 1043 (7th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Boudreaux, 502 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Christopher,
488 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1973); Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1969). Still other circuits imposed a duty of inquiry on the
trial judge which, if not carried out, shifted the burden of proof to the government. United
States v. Martorano, 620 F.2d 912, 915-16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980); Salomon
v. LaVallee, 575 F.2d 1051, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1972).
72 United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205, 1210 n.7 (8th Cir. 1975); Larry Buffalo Chief
v. South Dakota, 425 F.2d 271, 280 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Horak, 465 F. Supp. 725,
727 (D. Neb. 1979).
73 United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d at 1076. See note 63 supra.
74 See note 103 infa for the text of rule 44(c).
75 See note 103 in/fa and accompanying text.
76 77 F.R.D. 507, 600-01 (1978).
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upon the defendant's right to be represented by counsel of his
choice."
7
Another reason for not giving rule 44(c) an expansive construc-
tion results from the time at which the trial court must make its de-
termination regarding a conflict. The trial court's pre-trial judgment
as to whether a conflict will arise is necessarily prospective. It can,
therefore, only speculate as to whether an actual conflict will arise.
78
In this situation it makes better sense to protect the defendant's right
to choose counsel, which does exist and will surely be infringed upon
if the court disqualifies the attorney, rather than to protect the de-
fendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel, which may or
may not be infringed upon if a conflict does eventually arise.
II. Supreme Court Treatment of Joint Representation
A. Background Decisions
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of joint representa-
tion in Glasser v. United States.79 In Glasser the trial court appointed
Glasser's attorney (Stewart) to also represent defendant Kretske dur-
ing their joint trial. Both defendants were convicted. On appeal, the
Supreme Court found that Glasser's representation was not as effec-
tive as it might have been if Stewart had n6t been appointed as Kret-
ske's counsel.80 Thus, the Court held that Glasser had been denied
the effective assistance of counsel, stating that the sixth amendment
requires that the assistance of cousel be "untrammeled and
unimpaired" by a court order requiring a lawyer to represent con-
77 "The recently adopted FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 4 (c) does. . . not eliminate the defendant's
power to waive his right to be represented by a conflict-free attorney." United States v.
Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 24 n. I1 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (2d
Cir. 1982)(Curcio 1)).
78 Even though the possibility that a conflict of interest will arise is greater in a joint
representation situation than it is when co-defendants retain separate counsel, not all joint
representation will result in an actual conflict of interest. See United States v. Halbert, 640
F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Medel, 592 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979); United States v.
Valenzuela, 521 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976); United States v.
Mandell, 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976); United States v.
Boudreaux, 502 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972).
(All involved joint representation of criminal co-defendants where the courts found that no
actual or prejudicial conflict of interest existed.) Therefore, since not all joint representation
will in fact result in a conflict of interest, a trial court's pre-trial judgment as to whether a
conflict will in fact occur is necessarily speculative.
79 315 U.S. 60 (1932). For additional facts, see note 51 supra.
80 315 U.S. at 76.
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flicting interests simultaneously.8 '
The Court's opinion in Classer set an important precedent in
holding that joint representation could not be mandated if such rep-
resentation would create a conflict of interest. The decision was un-
clear, however, in several respects. For example, it did not specifically
state whether a finding of prejudice, in addition to conflict, was nec-
essary to establish a sixth amendment violation.8 2 It also did not ad-
dress the question whether a defendant seeking joint representation
could insist upon it.83
The Supreme Court in Holloway v. Arkansas8 4 answered the ques-
tion whether a finding of both prejudice and conflict was necessary to
establish a constitutional violation. There, the Court held that
prejudice would be assumed to exist when a defendant could show
that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his repre-
81 Id at 70.
82 The Supreme Court's language in Glasser relating to the amount of prejudice that
need be shown in order to find a constitutional violation caused considerable confusion
among the circuits. The Court declined to determine the precise degree of prejudice sus-
tained by Glasser as a result of the lower court's appointment of Stewart as counsel for Kret-
ske, stating that the right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to
allow courts to indulge in nice calculations regarding the amount of prejudice arising from its
denial. Id at 76. However, in discussing the question whether the other defendants had their
rights violated, the Court stated that to secure a new trial the other defendants must show
they were prejudiced in some manner. Id
Following Glasser, the circuit courts were unable to agree on whether both conflict and
prejudice had to be shown in order to establish a constitutional deprivation of the effective
assistance of counsel. The First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits did not require a showing of
prejudice. See, e.g., Austin v. Erikson, 477 F.2d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758, 761 (7th Cir.
1967). Conversely, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits did require a showing of
prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 569 F.2d 269, 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437
U.S. 906 (1978); United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 269 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 969 (1977); United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 452 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Lovano, 420 F.2d 769, 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970); Fryar v. United States,
404 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964 (1969). Additionally, the Third
Circuit required only a showing of a possible conflict of interest or prejudice. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 1973). The Fourth Circuit re-
quired a conflict, but only a possibility of prejudice. Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.
1966). For a thorough treatment of the question whether prejudice must be shown, see Geer,
Representation of Multiple Crminal Defendants: Confikcts of Interest and the Professional Responsiblity of
the Defense Attorng, 62 MINN. L. REv. 119, 123 nn.14-16 (1979); Girgenti, Problems ofJoint
Representation of Defendants in a Criminal Case, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 55, 56 n.6 (1979); Annot.,
53 A.L.R. FED. 140, 148-58 (1981).
83 To date, the Supreme Court has still not specifically addressed this question. Conse-
quently, different courts have imposed different duties on the trial judge. However, Fed. R.
Crim. P. 44(c) now requires a trial judge to inquire as to possible conflicts of interest in joint
representation situations. For the text of Rule 44 (c) see note 103 infra.
84 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
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sentation.85 The Supreme Court further held that the trial judge de-
prived the defendants of their constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel in two ways: first, by failing to appoint separate
counsel when the three co-defendants had specifically requested sep-
arate counsel because conflicts existed; and, second, by failing to take
adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk of a conflict of interest
was too remote to warrant separate counsel.8 6 Yet, Holloway also left
several questions unanswered. 87 The first is, how strong a showing of
conflict is required for the trial court to determine that a defendant
has been denied the effective assistance of counsel?88 The second is,
what is the nature and scope of the trial judge's affirmative duty to
assure that joint representation of conflicting interests does not de-
prive criminal defendants of their right to the effective assistance of
counsel?8 9
The Supreme Court addressed the first of these unanswered
questions in Cuyler v. Sullivan.90 In that case, Cuyler and two others
faced murder charges. The two other defendants retained two attor-
85 Id at 487-9 1. Thus, after Holloway, any defendant who could show that a conflict of
interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation did not need to demonstrate
prejudice in order to obtain relief. Id Se also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349 (1980).
However, Holloway did not state how strong the actual conflict had to be in order to find that
the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Id at 483. Therefore, the circuit
courts formulated different rules regarding the amount of conflict that the defendant had to
establish. The Third and Eighth Circuits required a showing of an actual conflict or of evi-
dence pointing to a substantial possibility of conflict. See, e.g., United States tx re. Sullivan v.
Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 522 (3d Cir. 1979),rev'd, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); United States v. Cox, 580
F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979); United States v. Lawriw, 568
F.2d 98, 101 (8th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978); United States ex rel Hart v.
Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 1973). However, the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
required the defendant to show some real conflict of interest before the court would find that
the defendant in a joint representation situation had been denied the effective assistance of
counsel. See, e.g., Willis v. United States, 614 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Medel, 592 F.2d 1305, 1310 (5th Cir. 1979); Salomon v. LaVallee, 575 F.2d 1051, 1054 (2d
Cir. 1978); United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1086 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
906 (1978); United States v. Mar, 526 F.2d 117, 119 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941
(1976). See also In re Special February, 1975 Grand Jury, 406 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
86 435 U.S. at 475.
87 Id at 483-84.
88 Id
89 Id The Court has never specifically answered this question. However, the recent pas-
sage of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) requiring the trial judge to inquire as to the
possibility of conflict when two or more defendants are jointly represented has restructured
the issue. The basic question now is whether rule 44(c) permits the trial court to undercut a
defendant's constitutionally protected right to be represented by chosen counsel even after the
court has made sufficient inquiry into the possibility of conflict and the defendant's desire to
retain chosen counsel.
90 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
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neys to jointly represent them. Cuyler, who did not have enough
money to retain separate counsel, was also represented by these attor-
neys.91 Cuyler was convicted; his co-defendants were acquitted at
later trials. Cuyler then challenged his conviction, claiming that his
attorneys had not presented any evidence in his defense because they
feared exposing the defense witnesses for the later trials.
92
The Supreme Court in Cuyler held that the mere possibility of
conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.9 3 Thus, in
order to demonstrate a violation of his sixth amendment rights, a
defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an
actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's perform-
ance.94 The Court further held that this standard applies regardless
of whether defense counsel is retained or appointed.9 5 The Court
also noted, however, that if the defendant does object to joint repre-
sentation, the trial court must afford him the opportunity to demon-
strate that potential conflicts inherent in the joint representation
impermissibly imperil his right to a fair trial.96 Moreover, the Court
stated that unless the trial court does not afford this opportunity, a
reviewing court must not presume that the mere possiblity of conflict
resulted in the ineffective assistance of counsel.
9 7
91 Cuyler, however, did not pay for this representation. Cuyler was tried first and did
not object before or during trial to the multiple representation. The evidence against Cuyler
was largely circumstantial and at the end of the prosecution's case the defense rested without
presenting any evidence of its own.
92 Id
93 Id at 348-50.
94 Id See also United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 938 (1981). The Ninth Circuit Court in Hearst followed Cuyler. The court also noted
that an actual conflict adversely affecting the lawyer's performance is not the same as an
actual conflict which adversely affects the outcome of the case. The defendant in a joint
representation case need only show that an actual conflict existed which adversely affected his
lawyer's performance and need not also show that counsel's incompetent assistance resulted in
actual prejudice.
95 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 344 (defendants who retain their own lawyers are not
entitled to less protection than those for whom counsel is appointed). See also United States ex.
re. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 1973).
In establishing the same standard for retained and appointed counsel, the Court did not
change the precedent that an indigent defendant has no right to choose appointed counsel to
jointly represent him. See generaly note 5 supra. The question of the right to choose counsel
was not before the Court. Rather, the Court in Cuyler merely held that if a defendant who
raised no objection to joint representation during trial later objects on appeal as to the effec-
tiveness of the representation, the court of appeals must apply the actual conflict standard
regardless of whether the attorney in the case was appointed or retained.
96 446 U.S. at 348.
97 Id An interesting question is whether the converse of this statement would also be
true; if the trial court fails to afford the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate that an
actual conflict exists, may a reviewing court presume that the possibility for conflict has re-
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While these three Supreme Court cases have cleared up many
questions regarding joint representation, one question they have not
specifically addressed is whether a criminal defendant has a constitu-
tionally protected right to choose retained counsel.98 Or, stated an-
other way, does a criminal defendant have the right to waive
separate counsel?99 Recently, the Court granted certiorari in United
States v. Flanagan 100 to address this question.
B. United States v. Flanagan
The defendants in Flanagan were charged with conspiracy to vio-
late the civil rights of citizens' 0 1 and with the substantive violation of
those rights. 10 2 The four defendants chose to present a common de-
fense and retained a single law firm to represent them. The district
court held a hearing pursuant to rule 44(c)10 3 to determine whether
suited in ineffective assistance of counsel? Most probably, the reviewing court would simply
remand the case to the trial court for a determination of the conflict issue. This happened in
Cuyler. (The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for application of the
actual conflict test.) Another interesting question arising after Cu/r is whether the principle
enunciated therein-that the trial court must afford the defendant an opportunity to demon-
strate conflict-may be extrapolated one step further, thereby also requiring a trial court to
inquire whether the defendant is aware of any conflicts that may exist and of the dangers
inherent in such a conflict.
98 Although both Holoway and Gasser have been cited as supporting the proposition that
a defendant can make an informed waiver of the right to separate counsel, see Annot., 64 L.
Ed. 2d 907, 937 (1981), the Supreme Court never specifically addressed that question in those
cases.
99 It is important to note that the defendant is waiving the right to separate counsel and
not necessarily the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Characterizing the defendant's
waiver as a waiver of the effective assistance of counsel is tantamount to stating that joint
representation per .re constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, a proposition which courts
have consistently rejected. See note 20supra and accompanying text. It is altogether possible
that a defendant will be more effectively represented if he'is allowed to retain an attorney
whom he trusts and respects, even though that attorney also represents another defendant. See
genera/lb note 16 supra and accompanying text.
100 679 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No.
82-374).
101 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976).
102 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 242 (1976).
103 FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c) became effective on December 1, 1980. It states:
Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged pursuant to Rule
8(b) or have been joined for trial pursuant to Rule 13, and are represented by the
same retained or assigned counsel or by retained or assigned counsel who are associ-
ated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such
joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of his right to the
effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears
that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court
shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to
counsel.
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the defendants were aware of the risks of joint representation and of
their rights to separate counsel. The court found that each defend-
ant was fully aware of the potential conflicts of joint representation
and had voluntarily and intelligently waived any claim of conflict of
interest in choosing to be represented by the same counsel. 0 4 None-
theless, the court refused to accept the waivers and disqualified the
defendants' law firm because it found that a conflict of interest was
very likely to arise in the course of the proceedings. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's holding, finding that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in disqualifying defendants' counsel. 10 5
The Third Circuit court in Flanagan predicated its decision on
the new rule 44(c) which the court interpreted as authorizing the
trial court to disqualify counsel in joint representation cases.' 0 6 The
rule's statement that "[u]nless it appears that there is good cause to
believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take
such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's
right to counsel" grants the trial court a great deal of discretion in
handling joint representation cases.' 0 7 Accordingly, the trial court
can disqualify counsel if it appears that an actual conflict of interest
is likely to arise. However, the critical question which Flanagan poses
for the Supreme Court is whether such broad discretion is war-
ranted,108 particularly when the defendant's right to be represented
by counsel of his choice hangs in the balance.
III. Rule 44(c): The Problem and the Solution in Flanagan
In Flanagan the Supreme Court will have to balance the defend-
ant's right to counsel of his choice with his right to the effective assist-
ance of counsel' 0 9 and with the judicial interest in promoting the
1
104 679 F.2d at 1073.
105 Id at 1076.
106 Id
107 Id
108 Flanagan presents five questions to the Supreme Court: (1) Is the court of appeals deci-
sion denying defendants the counsel of their choice, despite their valid waiver of potential
conflicts of interest, inconsistent with other Supreme Court and circuit court decisions? (2)
Does Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) permit a trial court to undercut a defendant's
constitutionally protected choice of retained counsel? (3) Does the lower court's opinion pre-
clude presentation of a common defense, regardless of the number or affiliation of counsel? (4)
Does the lower court's opinion undermine a client's ability to consult with and retain counsel
of his choice? (5) Will the resolution of these issues substantially diminish the workload of the
federal courts? 51 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 82-374).




effective administration ofjustice."10 By complying with the require-
ments of rule 44(c), without interpreting the rule too broadly,"' the
Court will establish an acceptable balance while still preserving the
defendant's right to be represented by counsel of his choice.
Once a trial judge has fulfilled his duty under rule 44(c) of in-
forming the defendant in a joint representation situation about possi-
ble conflicts and of his right to separate counsel, it becomes the
defendant's choice as to which course to take. If the defendant
wishes to assert his right to retain separate counsel, he may do so. If
the defendant wishes to assert the right to retain the attorney he orig-
inally chose, he may also do so. But the crucial point is that it must
be the defendant's choice, not the court's choice.112 Unless the de-
fendant is intentionally using his choice to impede the orderly func-
tioning of the court,"13 or unless the defendant is incompetent and
therefore incapable of making an informed decision to retain sepa-
rate or joint counsel, his wishes should be granted the utmost defer-
ence. Later, if his choice proves to have been unwise, just as a
decision to proceed pro se may also eventually prove to have been
unwise," 4 he cannot complain.
Not only will such a result be consistent with past Supreme
Court decisions, 1 5 but it will also aid in promoting the effective ad-
ministration ofjustice."16 Appellate courts will no longer have to de-
cide on a case by case basis whether or not an actual conflict existed
at the defendant's trial1' 7 or whether the defendant was prejudiced
by any conflict." 8  Rather, after the court has conducted an inquiry
pursuant to rule 44(c) and elicited the defendant's voluntary and in-
telligent waiver, it will have fulfilled its duty to safeguard the defend-
110 See note 20 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems involved in
striking this balance.
111 See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons for not
interpreting Rule 44(c) too broadly.
112 See United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.1982).
113 A defendant may not exercise his right to choose counsel solely as a dilatory tactic.
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). See United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); United States ex rel Baskerville v. Deegan, 428 F.2d 714 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 928 (1970).
114 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
115 Glasser, Holloway, and Cuyler all recognize that a defendant may waive the right to be
represented by separate counsel. See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
116 This is particularly interesting since the right to be represented by counsel of one's
choice is ordinarily viewed as being in tension with the effective administration ofjustice. See
note 20 sura and accompanying text.
117 Sec note 85 supra and accompanying text.
118 Sec note 82 supra and accompanying text.
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ant's sixth amendment rights.1 19 If the defendant refuses to waive
the right to separate counsel, only then may the court use the author-
ity granted under rule 44(c) to disqualify the attorney. 20 However,
in exercising its authority under rule 44(c), the trial court should also
exercise restraint so as to avoid unnecessarily infringing upon the de-
fendant's right to be represented by chosen counsel. The court will
then be able to effectuate the optimum balance between the defend-
ant's right to be represented by counsel of his choice, the defendant's
right to the effective assistance of counsel, and the judicial considera-
tions concerning the effective administration of justice.
VI. Conclusion
The right to counsel contains four distinct concepts: the right to
have counsel, the right to the effective assistance of counsel, the right
to a preparation period sufficient to ensure minimal quality of coun-
sel, and the right to choose counsel. The judiciary must balance
these concepts to ensure that one area of the right to counsel does not
overshadow another. In striking this balance, however, the courts
should not take a narrow approach. Rather, they should give a de-
fendant much leeway in deciding which aspect of the right to counsel
he wishes to stress. The courts need only establish a framework
within which each defendant will be informed of any conflict. Then,
he may balance these rights in the manner in which he desires. Rule
44(c) provides a vehicle through which courts may establish this
framework.
By affording the defendant the freedom to choose whether to
119 See Salomon v. LaVallee, 575 F.2d 1051, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Swan-
son, 509 F.2d 1205, 1210 n.7 (8th Cir. 1975); Larry Buffalo Chief v. South Dakota, 425 F.2d
271, 280 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Horak, 465 F. Supp. 725 (D. Neb. 1979). All state
that after the court has inquired into possible conflicts and the defendant has voluntarily and
intelligently waived his right to separate counsel, the defendant's conviction will not be over-
turned on the basis that joint representation denied him the effective assistance of counsel. As
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out in United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072
(3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 82-374), however, the
trial judge's perspective should not be limited to a concern with not having a conviction
overturned. Yet, insulating a conviction from later attack is a valid judicial concern; in
avoiding subsequent reversals the trial court is promoting the effective administration of
justice.
120 The defendant will, therefore, be prohibited from using his waiver right to impair the
orderly functioning of the judicial process. The defendant will be given the choice of retain-
ing separate or joint counsel. If the defendant insists on retaining joint counsel, but will not
waive the right to conflict-free counsel, the court may then, under rule 44(c), force the defend-
ant to choose between waiving the right to conflict-free representation and retaining joint
counsel. United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1978).
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retain separate counsel or be jointly represented, and ensuring that
this choice is an informed one, courts will be using the Constitution
to protect the defendant, rather than to enslave him.
Karen A. Covy
